

Marsilio's Reading Group

Led by	Marsilio Gagliano
Title	Critique of Daniel Dennett's "Intentional Systems" Part II
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DISCUSSION:

[12:09] Marsilio Gagliano: good afternoon; I thought we'd pick up where we left off last week; we were debating whether there is a real distinction between systems that are intentional and systems that behave 'as if' they are intentional. Dennett denied any real difference in kind, which delighted some and shocked others - that's where we had left it. Any thoughts?

[12:11] Simulat Almendros: I didn't think he was denying the difference - I thought he was just saying there is no sharp boundary between them

[12:11] Oswy Gothly: Brentano Intentionality is the mark of the mental?

[12:12] Marsilio Gagliano: if we look at the examples he gives, he seems to assert that some systems -- like computers -- are intentional and have more than a derived intentionality -- like the robot poker player

[12:12] toBe Destiny: I have some thoughts about this non distinction

[12:12] Marsilio Gagliano: the passage at the bottom of page 8 is also instructive

[12:12] Simulat Almendros: And that's because there is a continuum involved from 'as if' intentional systems and real ones - and its like red is different than yellow, but there is no sharp boundary with red on one side and yellow on the other

[12:13] Marya Blaisdale: Marsilio, don't you think the only difference between a robot poker player's intention and human intention is emotion and/or the application of meaning to events?

[12:13] toBe Destiny: and then how he defines computer programs themselves to be intentional is this not simply incorrect? Thus, all that follows is pointless

[12:14] Marsilio Gagliano: well, at the bottom of page 8 he says such artefacts have internal states that have meaning for them that may be unknown to us; it seems like he does say they can 'ponder' meaning

[12:14] Simulat Almendros: I thought he defined an intentional system as one that we can usefully treat as an intentional system when working with it - that is, we can usefully take the intentional stance towards things

[12:14] toBe Destiny: these internal states - what are they? Does the program inspect the internal state in the way that a human is aware of self?

[12:15] Marsilio Gagliano: I suppose states of the computer -- the states it 'enjoys' in virtue of its programming - this is not internal to anything, however...

[12:15] Marsilio Gagliano: no Sim, his thesis is much stronger than that

[12:15] toBe Destiny: states of a computer program

[12:16] Marsilio Gagliano: yes, Tobe

[12:16] Simulat Almendros: How so Marsilio?

[12:16] toBe Destiny: listens?

[12:16] Marsilio Gagliano: he denies that his position is a "merely instrumentalist" strategy, which is what you are proposing Sim see page 14

[12:17] Simulat Almendros: looking

[12:17] Marsilio Gagliano: I don't know, Tobe, it is very difficult for me to see how something can 'matter' to a computer or how a computer could have an emotion like joy

[12:17] toBe Destiny: I agree Marsilio

[12:18] Marya Blaisdale: a computer does not have neural structures to experience such emotions - hence it cannot - is that not a given?

[12:18] Oswy Gothly: Yes, Machines = No Qualia?

[12:18] Marsilio Gagliano: it is not such a leap for me to think that an amoeba

[12:18] Marsilio Gagliano: I don't think that is a given for Dennett, Marya

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- [12:19] toBe Destiny: (the discussion seems to be wrongly started, wrongly developed and wrongly communicate... and as I have studied Dennett's work as well as others - I am not sure why Dennett has any standing at all.)
- [12:19] Simulat Almendros: Hmm - not super clear about what an instrumentalist position is but at the top of page 15 he says "The fact that the theory is maximally neutral about the internal structures that accomplish the rational competences it presupposes has led to several attempted counterexamples:"
- [12:19] Marsilio Gagliano: Marya, look at the top pg page 19 -- he says his theory is neutral with respect to the structures which give rise to or explain intentionality
- [12:20] Marsilio Gagliano: instrumentalist = if theory works to predict something's behavior, then that thing "is" for all practical purposes what the theory says it is
- [12:20] toBe Destiny: Pribram - a well known cognitive neuroscientist - and I have talked about this position by Dennett as being merely an exercise in illusion. And can bring the neuroscience into play any time there is someone who understands that literature
- [12:21] Marya Blaisdale: well, in a sense I can agree - specifically because I do perceive intentionality to be a process that is not unique to humans or more advanced life forms - I do think however, it is a human interpretation of a process that occurs in other life forms, that do not have our advanced neural structures
- [12:21] toBe Destiny: what is hard to understand is why this theory of Dennett's has standing
- [12:22] Marsilio Gagliano: what about an amoeba? Can something matter to an amoeba?
- [12:22] Oswy Gothly: The issue is not in the hardware but in the nature of the software.
- [12:22] toBe Destiny: yes, it is about the biology Marya
- [12:22] Marsilio Gagliano: if something can matter to an amoeba, then the structure that makes intentionality possible need not be too complex
- [12:23] toBe Destiny: the computer program is deemed to be deterministic and to not have the properties of complexity that as seen in any living system... this is the position of Roger Penrose and Robert Rosen and others
- [12:23] Oswy Gothly: For an Amoeba Possibly in Amoeba terms
- [12:23] Marya Blaisdale: well I think the interpretation of 'mattering' is the problem here
- [12:23] toBe Destiny: is deemed
- [12:23] Marya Blaisdale: yes, Oswy
- [12:23] Marsilio Gagliano: so, for you Marya, an intentional amoeba is as silly as an intentional computer?
- [12:23] Marya Blaisdale: No - for me it is the use of the word 'intentional' and what it implies :)
- [12:23] toBe Destiny: Marya is correct there is intentionality in any biology
- [12:23] Marsilio Gagliano: what is your position on the amoeba?
- [12:23] Simulat Almendros: hmmm - I still don't see that the things towards which we take an intentional stance are intentional in the sense of phenomenology
- [12:24] Marya Blaisdale: I think an amoeba has the same processes - it just doesn't have the neural structure to make interpretations about those processes; it does what it does
- [12:24] Marsilio Gagliano: then you disagree with Dennett, Sim
- [12:24] toBe Destiny: I agree with Marya
- [12:24] Simulat Almendros: the intentional stance is something in us, not something in the object towards which we take it
- [12:24] Marsilio Gagliano: hmmm, so amoeba does not enjoy or suffer?
- [12:25] toBe Destiny: the intentional stance is a technical definition constructed to serve a purpose in a polemic
- [12:25] Marya Blaisdale: I don't know Marsilio, does it have a limbic system similar to ours? :P
- [12:25] Oswy Gothly: A machine can only derive its s if intentionality from us.
- [12:25] toBe Destiny: can one find the origin of this "intentional stance"
- [12:25] Simulat Almendros: it's just that we can profitably say of something that it acts as if it intends to achieve some goal

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- [12:25] toBe Destiny: yes, the computer can act to express the intention of humans
- [12:25] Marsilio Gagliano: why does it work, Sim? That would be Dennett's question
- [12:26] toBe Destiny: Marsilio has the good point
- [12:26] Marsilio Gagliano: blue birds don't Tobe; are they intentional systems?
- [12:26] Oswy Gothly: The computer is an excellent mimic? In some areas?
- [12:26] toBe Destiny: birds are intentional
- [12:26] toBe Destiny: of course
- [12:26] Marsilio Gagliano: ok
- [12:26] toBe Destiny: as are insects
- [12:27] Simulat Almendros: hmmm - he makes it clear when talking about a chess playing computer that you cannot play the game unless you assume that the machine intends to win a game of chess
- [12:27] Marsilio Gagliano: where does real intentionality stop and as if intentionality begin?
- [12:27] Marsilio Gagliano: as soon as there is life there is intentionality?
- [12:27] toBe Destiny: this is simply where Dennett uses misleading language; in the chess game
- [12:27] Simulat Almendros: he doesn't say that the machine really does intend - he says that we have to act towards it as if it wants to win
- [12:27] Marya Blaisdale: I would say as soon as there is 'matter' there is what we call intentionality, but this is a grossly simplified way of saying it
- [12:28] Marsilio Gagliano: <---- wants a list of the necessary conditions for something's being really intentional
- [12:28] toBe Destiny: as soon as there is life there is intentionality
- [12:28] Marsilio Gagliano: computers are material; but computers, you argue, are not intentional
- [12:28] toBe Destiny: but intentionality may exists also in matter, but not computer programs - the programs are not
- [12:29] Simulat Almendros: if you strive for a goal, don't you intend to achieve the goal? I think that that is not intentionality - its just striving for a goal
- [12:29] Marsilio Gagliano: so the macromolecule to which Dennett refers, it may be intentional because it may be 'living' in some real sense?
- [12:29] toBe Destiny: the computers are matter, but the pre-intentional phenomenon is not so similar to a blue bird
- [12:29] toBe Destiny: yes Marsilio
- [12:30] Marya Blaisdale: maybe it is safer to say that intent is in programming, be that biological or computer wise - we do what we are programmed to do - so I here would go back to how 'we' interpret that process and then call it intent, which maybe gives it a certain meaning that it does not necessarily have
- [12:30] toBe Destiny: if a person strives for a goal that is ALWAYS an expression of intentionality; how could it not be?
- [12:30] Marsilio Gagliano: here's the question then: most of the time we adopt a physical stance towards matter, a stance in which matter has no 'life' of its own
- [12:30] Simulat Almendros: Marsilio - the macro molecule is a system that replicates - it can be understood as being something that strives to achieve the goal of replicating
- [12:30] harmoniasophia Scribe: we are the maker of the computer , we purposed it and so the intention is referred not intrinsic, but the "stuff: we used to make the computer more fundamentally and as "matter" itself may have a purpose unknown to man that in such a way opposes what we intend in the "form"
- [12:30] toBe Destiny: the intention is as Marya is pointing out, it is expressed via the program by a human
- [12:30] Marsilio Gagliano: is the physical stance an abstraction of sorts that does not capture the full reality of matter?
- [12:31] Simulat Almendros: it goes through a long series of steps in order to replicate
- [12:31] toBe Destiny: matter is alive; abstract is not

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- [12:31] Oswy Gothly: Intentionality seems to be something biologically evolved and involves self reflection and probably consciousness. In fact Consciousness could be the starting point. Machines can't be intentional or conscious in that sense although they can be given as if intentionality and appear to strive for goals. But their striving has no sense of striving to them.
- [12:31] toBe Destiny: mathematics for example
- [12:32] Marya Blaisdale: Tobe, you perceive that atoms are alive? Mmm, that is an interesting way of looking at it
- [12:32] toBe Destiny: I do
- [12:32] toBe Destiny: I agree with Oswy
- [12:32] Marsilio Gagliano: so, 2b, as you see it, in the physical stance -- as it applies to matter rather than the things we make out of it -- treats what is living 'as if' it were not
- [12:32] toBe Destiny: well, in quantum physics there is evidence of intentionality
- [12:33] Marsilio Gagliano: that would make you a panpsychist, Tobe
- [12:33] toBe Destiny: but this intentionality is part of the nature of being physical - unlike a computer program which is simply an abstraction
- [12:33] toBe Destiny: deterministic in nature
- [12:33] Simulat Almendros: I agree with Oswy too - they appear to us to be striving, but they themselves have no sense of striving
- [12:33] Marsilio Gagliano: well, it would seem that Oswy/Sim disagree with 2b
- [12:33] toBe Destiny: in part but not totally
- [12:33] Marsilio Gagliano: and Marya seems to agree with Tobe
- [12:33] Marya Blaisdale: well, in part too :)
- [12:34] toBe Destiny: the issue is deterministic verses non-deterministic. There are no non-deterministic computer programs
- [12:34] harmoniasophia Scribe: Oswy I disagree Consciousness transcend mankind, and is the starting, but although we have a neuro network that cause us to have awareness of this consciousness does not mean that the fundamental matter itself is not conscious
- [12:34] Marsilio Gagliano: on the matter of matter itself being alive/intentional, Tobe and Marya have argues yes; sim and Oswy argue no
- [12:35] toBe Destiny: to exclude consciousness from matter is to take a step that science has not and might never be able to justify
- [12:35] Marsilio Gagliano: that would put Harmonia in Tobe's camp
- [12:35] Oswy Gothly: Harmonia, I made that point because there are some philosophers who see Consciousness as the source of Intentionality. The key issue is the issue of self reflection qualia whatever you want to call it. Biological systems evolve that quality other machines don't have it Yet?
- [12:35] toBe Destiny: Oswy does not really argue that matter is not "alive", do you?
- [12:36] Simulat Almendros: Marsilio - it doesn't make sense to me to say that matter is alive - we use alive to indicate matter that has a certain intricate internal structure that allows it to replicate - being alive is a subset of matter, and since its a subset not all matter is alive
- [12:36] Oswy Gothly: "B For me a pile of matter is a pile of matter. Biological piles of matter are different to computer piles of matter?
- [12:37] Marya Blaisdale: I think looking at matter as being alive; an atom for example, is a pretty interesting way of perceiving it - something I had not really considered before. I do not believe in some sort of overarching consciousness however. I have made my views on consciousness known before - and that is I do think consciousness and all that goes with it (including intentionality) is a system of reactiveness. From the simplest of structures, to the awesome complexity of the human brain, these are all systems of reactiveness - the more complex the system, the more complex the behaviour of those systems
- [12:37] Marsilio Gagliano: note that 'pile' implies disorganization, the non-organic
- [12:38] toBe Destiny: so in the collapse of the wave in quantum mechanisms, as Hameroff would talk about this - self orchestrated collapse - there is a act of "being alive". this is not the same as

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we refer to when we talk about a human being alive.... the distinction is one of degree... however, Dennett confuses all of us with a philosophical construction which is silly

[12:38] Marsilio Gagliano: the lines of disagreement are getting pretty clear

[12:38] toBe Destiny: and harmful to understanding

[12:38] Marsilio Gagliano: at least he is clear 2b; he means what he says and says it well

[12:38] Marsilio Gagliano: I don't agree with all he has to say

[12:38] Oswy Gothly: Marsilio perhaps I didn't put it well. I am really saying that a concentration at the level of mater wont tell us anything about intentionality at all it's the wrong level to look at. Let's look at humans who clearly do have Intentionality and computers that have as if

[12:38] toBe Destiny: oh my

[12:38] Marsilio Gagliano: but I don't find him harmful

[12:38] toBe Destiny: yes he is clear

[12:39] toBe Destiny: I do

[12:39] toBe Destiny: and others do also, the folly of AI is so profound and such a waste of human time

[12:39] Marsilio Gagliano: that is a safe approach, Oswy, as a method

[12:39] Marya Blaisdale: aye Oswy, there definitely are distinctions in levels of interpretations - I think most are valid on their own levels

[12:39] Marsilio Gagliano: for figuring out human consciousness

[12:39] toBe Destiny: we spend perhaps a billion dollars in basic research to create an AI, and have done nothing other than confuse natural science and the public

[12:39] toBe Destiny: smiles

[12:40] Marsilio Gagliano: but as a metaphysical position about the nature of reality -- it may presuppose rather than show that matter as such lacks intentionality

[12:40] toBe Destiny: this is where the harm is

[12:40] Oswy Gothly: Marsilio I see no point in privileging investigation at teh atomic level in teh search for intentionlity

[12:41] Marya Blaisdale: why not Oswy, if it helps us to understand the process?

[12:41] Marsilio Gagliano: if, like Marya, we allow for levels of intentionality, then there is a lot of hard work ahead of us, as we have to understand each level

[12:41] toBe Destiny: the Bell's inequality and other parts of observable physics tells us that biology is already there in any atom or chemistry - it is organized in more complex ways... yes but the issues again is about where there is replication and non-locality (I humbly submit)

[12:41] Marsilio Gagliano: it might be quite handy for resolving some aspects of the mind-body problem, Oswy

[12:42] Simulat Almendros: is there even such a thing as intentionality (a noun) isn't there instead the act of intending (a verb)

[12:42] Marsilio Gagliano: Tobe is a panpsychist

[12:42] toBe Destiny: stratification theory is developed in my work and others

[12:42] Oswy Gothly: Marya, that's my point, there is nothing revealed of the intentional at teh atomic level? Aoms are not intentional larger systems are?

[12:42] toBe Destiny: not sure what that is - panpsychist?

[12:42] Marsilio Gagliano: it may be that the levels of intentionality are different modes of process, Sim

[12:42] toBe Destiny: I do not think that this will characterize my work

[12:42] Marsilio Gagliano: the noun-verb debate cuts both ways and leaves us with the same question

[12:43] Marsilio Gagliano: you certainly sound like one, Tobe

[12:43] toBe Destiny: well I thing that you make a category error

[12:43] Marsilio Gagliano: how so?

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- [12:43] Marya Blaisdale: well I think they are Oswy - I think the problem or conflict arises when we apply a word like 'intentional' to something like an atom because intentionality tends to imply thought, meaning, emotions etc - where we don't suppose an atom has such things
- [12:43] toBe Destiny: my work is well developed and does not simple
- [12:44] harmoniasophia Scribe: I have a question?
- [12:44] Oswy Gothly: Marya, where is the evidence that atoms exhibit intentionality?
- [12:44] toBe Destiny: Robert Rosen wrote a book called Intentional Systems; I was a student of his
- [12:44] harmoniasophia Scribe: Does "gravity" as a "law" have intention?
- [12:44] Marsilio Gagliano: I think panpsychist is a legitimate position, I don't use the term with a derogatory sense -- Plato, Plotinus, Leibniz, Spinoza, Whitehead, Hartshorne were all panpsychists in some way and I don't think their work is underdeveloped
- [12:45] toBe Destiny: gravity is a necessary element to life as we know it
- [12:45] Simulat Almendros: Marsilio - it's clear to me that a lot of metaphysical muddles come up when people treat verbs as nouns - that is pretty easy to understand the idea that we take the intentional stance towards something - that is we act towards something in a particular way - but looking for intentionality in something leads us nowhere
- [12:45] toBe Destiny: as are the other laws of physics
- [12:45] Marya Blaisdale: They don't exhibit such things Oswy - they exhibit certain behaviours - those same behaviours, as the human brain level of complexity, are interpreted as intentionality, for example - but we don't see that atoms feel, think and perceive as we do, because they don't - they do not have our level of complexity obviously
- [12:45] harmoniasophia Scribe: or any "law" found in nature that transcend mans ability to manipulate?
- [12:45] toBe Destiny: I follow Whitehead a lot but I feel that there is more to the modern science
- [12:45] Marsilio Gagliano: I see Sim, but I think you tend to see all metaphysical position as somehow muddled
- [12:46] toBe Destiny: interesting; all positions are muddled; so this position should not be criticized because it is profoundly muddled?
- [12:46] Marya Blaisdale: lol
- [12:46] toBe Destiny: a new turn to this discussion
- [12:46] Marsilio Gagliano: I don't see any insurmountable difficulty in claiming that an atom can feel in some way
- [12:47] Marsilio Gagliano: I think it is incomplete
- [12:47] harmoniasophia Scribe: Seems erroneous without "law" there is NOTHING!
- [12:47] Oswy Gothly: Complex systems of a biological type exhibit behaviours that are intentional. I don't see any need for reductionism to the atomic level to explain that. The whole idea of an Atom exhibiting behaviour is dubious.
- [12:47] toBe Destiny: I will try to state this clearly..... The living system using natural law, the computer program does not; there is no complex computer program
- [12:47] harmoniasophia Scribe: yes Tobe the computer functions according to natural law
- [12:48] Simulat Almendros: I'm coming to that conclusion Marsilio - still looking for a metaphysical issue that isn't muddled, though I do think that metaphysics is very useful for getting at the axioms at the base of our thinking
- [12:48] toBe Destiny: complexity is a halting condition for a computing device; the program does not; the computer does
- [12:48] Chazz Heliosense: "natural law" -what is that?
- [12:48] toBe Destiny: there is a difference
- [12:48] toBe Destiny: the natural reality
- [12:48] Marsilio Gagliano: so perhaps we should step back from the intentionality issue and ponder the 'life' issue; that is, what it is to be alive
- [12:48] harmoniasophia Scribe: hahaha

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- [12:48] toBe Destiny: ah, good good
- [12:49] harmoniasophia Scribe: now you may progress if you can answer this
- [12:49] toBe Destiny: we see that the notion that a computer is alive is silly
- [12:49] Marya Blaisdale: They can explain certain things Oswy, but that doesn't take anything away from other levels of explanation - for example: there are psychological levels of explaining certain behaviours, there are socio-cultural levels, biophysical etc, none of these levels of explanation, I think, are any less valid than the other - it really depends on what 'you' are looking for
- [12:49] Marsilio Gagliano: that way, we could postpone the question if whether intentionality is human or vertebrate specific
- [12:49] Oswy Gothly: If atoms feel things then any sort of matter could be conscious and intentional Pity they don't in any meaningful sense of feel.
- [12:49] toBe Destiny: Oswy, can you restate what you are talking about; I do not follow?
- [12:49] Marsilio Gagliano: there would be levels of consciousness, Oswy
- [12:50] toBe Destiny: there would be different types of consciousness; not necessary organized into a linear thing
- [12:50] toBe Destiny: an ontology
- [12:50] Marsilio Gagliano: we may disagree whether an amoeba is conscious, but certainly we all agree they are alive no?
- [12:50] Marya Blaisdale: I don't think atoms do feel Oswy, because, as far as I know, they don't have the neural systems in place that allow for such feelings
- [12:50] toBe Destiny: yes
- [12:50] Simulat Almendros: I agree
- [12:51] toBe Destiny: neural systems and feeling may be related, but we stated by talking about intentionality
- [12:51] Marsilio Gagliano: I don't think nerves feel because nerves don't have neural systems of their own?
- [12:51] toBe Destiny: and an atom is a part of an intentional physical reality; abstractions are mental constructions
- [12:51] harmoniasophia Scribe: hahaha Marsilio good
- [12:51] Simulat Almendros: Smiles at Marsilio :-)
- [12:51] Marsilio Gagliano: :)
- [12:51] toBe Destiny: they are intentionally only in the sense that we humans use computer programs to express intention
- [12:52] Marsilio Gagliano: they are certainly alive though
- [12:52] toBe Destiny: this is where Dennett confuses us
- [12:52] Simulat Almendros: Its not nerves that feel - it's that systems of nerves act in a way that we call feeling
- [12:52] Marya Blaisdale: well that does depend on what you mean by 'feel' Marsilio :P - they do what they do after all, transmitting info to and from the brain - it is the organism that feels :P
- [12:52] Marya Blaisdale: right Sim, agreed
- [12:52] harmoniasophia Scribe: mental constructions are abstract....what is consciousness that I may think
- [12:52] toBe Destiny: it is the organism that feels
- [12:52] Oswy Gothly: Marsilio said I don't see any insurmountable difficulty in claiming that an atom can feel in some way. Marya and you seemed to be saying that all matter was alive and so had intentionality. I don't agree. I think that is fatally reductionist.
- [12:52] Marsilio Gagliano: I would suggest that as multicellular organisms, nerves do feel
- [12:53] toBe Destiny: please explain
- [12:53] toBe Destiny: harmoniasophia Scribe: mental constructions are abstract....what is consciousness that I may think
- [12:53] Oswy Gothly: that's an answer to Tobe

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- [12:53] Marsilio Gagliano: and thus, not all feelers need have neural systems of their own
- [12:53] Shak Maroon: Sorry for flitting in and out. Laptop overheat plus crash. SL processor intensive? My take here is that Dennett is trying to entice us onto his ground, where the end point, he hopes, is to explain intentionality and consciousness away.
- [12:53] toBe Destiny: oh Oswy, then we are not communicating.... my fault, sorry
- [12:53] Simulat Almendros: Marsilio - nerves to respond to stimulus - is that what you mean by feeling?
- [12:54] Marsilio Gagliano: electrons do too
- [12:54] toBe Destiny: yes I agree and Shak I find harm in that
- [12:54] Chazz Heliosense thinks Shak deserves a cigar
- [12:54] Marsilio Gagliano: to respond implies to feel
- [12:54] toBe Destiny: because the natural science does not explain away such things
- [12:54] harmoniasophia Scribe: does an atom respond?
- [12:54] toBe Destiny: I agree, (hands out cigars)
- [12:54] toBe Destiny: yes; an atom responds
- [12:54] Marsilio Gagliano: all causality involves feeling at some level
- [12:54] Marya Blaisdale: it works on levels though Marsilio, and you know this - the cellular level being the neuron, the tissue level being nerves, ganglia, nuclei, the organ level being the brain, spinal cord and brain stem, then the system level and then the organism level - the organism 'feel's - the rest do what they are programmed to do biologically
- [12:54] harmoniasophia Scribe: then they must "feel"
- [12:54] toBe Destiny: may I lay out the natural science?
- [12:55] Simulat Almendros: Shak - I don't think he's trying to explain it away - he is instead trying to show how it happens
- [12:55] toBe Destiny: the atoms is anticipatory
- [12:55] Marsilio Gagliano: right Marya, and so I think there are real levels of 'feelings' all the way down; to be is to feel
- [12:55] toBe Destiny: he is wrong in how he explains; it is just not the way it is
- [12:56] Marya Blaisdale: sure Marsilio, so maybe the issue is the interpretation and not the functions
- [12:56] toBe Destiny: Dennett and the other philosophers of his type simply harm our ability to understand what intentionality and consciousness is
- [12:56] Chazz Heliosense: or to free us of an illusion
- [12:56] Marsilio Gagliano: so I got a great reading for our next discussion, a reading on what "to be alive" means
- [12:56] Simulat Almendros: hehe - he is trying to show that consciousness isn't a thing - it's an activity :-)
- [12:57] Shak Maroon: A good cigar is a smoke! Dennett is a good guy; I just think he's wrong in this. Intentionality starts with ourselves. It's what we know from nothing about our own consciousness. A given, not something to be explained. We imput consciousness to others because we think, with reason, they are like ourselves.
- [12:57] Marya Blaisdale: awesome Marsilio - what is the text?
- [12:57] Oswy Gothly: Marsilio, that is a very idiosyncratic way to use the word feeling. A rock on a beach feels because the atoms in it feel?
- [12:57] Marsilio Gagliano: Nature Alive, the companion to the other essay we read, Nature Lifeless
- [12:58] harmoniasophia Scribe: I disagree Oswy, all philosophy is a search for Truth, it is a matter of deduction thru reasoning what "seems" logical and what does not, more often we grow in understanding through the things we can rule out through logic rather than the things that "seem" logical
- [12:59] toBe Destiny: this discussion has been good, and I am pleased that people have allowed me to speak, thank you - my work is at www.ontologystream.com

Marsilio's Reading Group

[12:59] Oswy Gothly: Harmonia I think my logic leads to different conclusions after all we are all after truth.

[12:59] Simulat Almendros: I don't think he's flat out wrong at all 2b - I think he is making good progress at understanding things that metaphysicians have been stumped about for 2000 years

[13:00] Psyche Dorchester: Thank you for letting me listen in. this has all been very interesting, and I learned a great deal about the issues surrounding this discussion

[13:00] Shak Maroon: I didn't meet him, but I sat near the front at Tucson '96 when D and David Chalmers took a rostrum each. Chalmers said we all would mind if D wanted to think of himself as a zombie (technical term), as long as he wouldn't be thinking of the rest of us in the same way. Kind of cheap jibe, but it got a laugh.