

Second Philosophy

Led by	Vajra Raymaker
Title	Intentionality
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INTRODUCTION

In this note I describe the phenomenon, and list some of the questions we can take up.

Mental states, such as belief, are said to be 'intentional'. That is, they are "of" or "about" or "directed upon" some object or objects. For example, Fred's belief that spiders make fine pets is (on the face of it) about spiders. Alice's belief that Fred should return Alice's stockings is (apparently) about Fred and a pair of stockings. When someone believes something or hopes or fears or desires something, she represents objects in a certain way, as having certain characteristics.

Intentional objects are represented objects.

Intentionality is a very odd sort of relation, if it is a relation at all. An intentional mental state relates a person to some object that she is thinking about, yet the objects to which a person is supposedly thus related may fail to exist, as for example, when Bob believes that leprechauns make fine pets or that Spiderman will be arriving soon. An object that fails to exist is nothing at all.

By contrast, genuine relations manifest only where the relata actually exist. For example, the relation --being on top of--, as in "The book is on top of the table", or the relation --kicking--, as in "Alice kicked Fred" hold between objects that actually exist, if they hold at all.

A second distinctive feature of the relation (or quasi-relation) of intentionality is that a person can believe something under one description of the object(s) involved, but not under another description. For example, famously Oedipus believed it would be a good idea to marry Jocasta, the beautiful Queen of Thebes. But Jocasta was his mother, and he did not believe it would be a good idea to marry his mother. Or so he said, we can imagine.

So intentional objects have two features:

1. Seemingly, people can think about things that do not exist.

And ...

2. It makes a big difference how the objects of a person's desires or beliefs are described as to whether people will actually admit to having them. I am sure that you can think of your own examples here.

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QUESTIONS:

There are many interesting issues about intentionality. Here are some:

1. In the case where someone is thinking about an object that does not exist, what is she REALLY thinking about? An idea of the object?
2. If a person believes or desires something when it is described one way, but does not believe it when it is described in another way (as in the case of poor Oedipus) does this person have contradictory beliefs?
3. If you look at a television image, are you seeing the person whose image it is, or just the image? Now consider thought rather than visual perception. What is your thought about: The person or the image? How about the representations on SL? Is your thought about the image or the person?
4. What underlying natural processes could be capable of supporting our ability to represent objects? Could it be because of our causal interactions with them? But then, what should we say about beliefs about Pegasus, Santa and so on? We certainly don't have any causal interactions with them.
5. Famously, the philosopher Brentano said that intentionality was the mark of the mental. But does EVERY kind of mental state or attitude involve intentionality, or only some of them? Specifically, do emotions such as fear or anger have intentional objects, or is this an illusion? (Consider that emotions contrast with cognitive states such as belief in that they have a qualitative aspect -- a way they "feel".) Are there states of awareness that are not 'about' anything at all?

We can talk about any of these questions, but to narrow things down, I suggest (1) to start and then wherever the conversation takes us, without expecting to get to more than two of the questions. I

REFERENCE:

<http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/intentionality/> (Sections 1, 2 and 10)

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DISCUSSION:

Vajra Raymaker:

I am so glad that there are people here who are interested in this topic. I would like to go through some of the points in the note card one by one and then we can focus on one or two of the issues, as people desire.

I am sure that there will be many thoughts going by fast and I will do my best to respond to what people say.

Now I have described the phenomenon. Let us consider the first issue that arises:

1. In the case where someone is thinking about an object that does not exist, what is she REALLY thinking about? An idea of the object?

[12:13] Renald Starostin: Suppose ideas exist.

[12:14] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, okay Ren

[12:14] Chance Luckstone: surely, we can have ideas about things that do not exist

[12:14] Vajra Raymaker: How can we Chance, if they do not exist?

[12:14] Simulat Almendros: if a thought is an action of the mind does it take something that exists to cause that action? I'd say no

[12:14] Renald Starostin: Chance, perhaps, but that may be a separate issue.

[12:14] Oswy Gothly: Like Pegasus the Flying Horse; I know him well?

[12:14] JJ Drinkwater: But we can tell the difference between "thinking of Descartes" and "Thinking of our idea of Descartes" when we do it...

[12:15] Chance Luckstone: the idea is separate from the actual

[12:15] Vajra Raymaker: Okay, good thought Sim. But then why is the thought about what it is

[12:15] Vajra Raymaker: Oswy, maybe in SL : -)

[12:15] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, perfect JJ

[12:15] Chance Luckstone: I can think of a omnipotent, omniscient, wholly good being.... but that doesn't mean he/she exists

[12:15] Renald Starostin: All, when I suggest that thoughts exist, I do not mean to suggest that they are measurable, physical, etc. They MAY be, but I'm not requiring that.

[12:15] Oswy Gothly: No Vajra I knew him before SL form book of the Greek Myths.

[12:15] JJ Drinkwater is very suspicious of "mental entities"....including Avatars :D

[12:15] Chance Luckstone: yes, Pegasus is another

[12:16] Vajra Raymaker: Well, then Chance, you aren't thinking of it, I would argue. But something else

[12:16] Simulat Almendros: Vajra - the ideas that we think of can be fictions - ie made up - or they can be items we get from culture

[12:16] Chance Luckstone: Please continue the thought, Vajra

[12:16] Vajra Raymaker: Well, Oswy, you knew a description I guess for sure : -)

[12:16] Chance Luckstone: if I am not thinking of it, what am I doing?

[12:17] Oswy Gothly: I could conceive of a flying horse it seemed a possibility because I knew about horses flying and wings.

[12:17] harmoniasophia Scribe: where does the thought of non existent things come from?

[12:17] Alaya Kumaki: as well as a pixel doll ^

[12:17] Sage Hartmann: is existence a predicate that can be meaningfully applied to any object? If not, then is there even a problem here?

[12:17] Oswy Gothly: Vajra, Pegasus was conceivable?

[12:17] Alaya Kumaki: some things were metaphor

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- [12:18] Chance Luckstone: it's like Plato's forms, the perfect chalk doesn't exist, doesn't mean I can't think of it
- [12:18] Vajra Raymaker: Here are the options: (1) the thought of Pegasus is really about something else (2) the thought of Pegasus is not about anything at all
- [12:18] Thoth Jantzen: the thing is, when we think, different thought structures or patterns come into play.. When we perceive things, it is patterns of our perception vs. those we have stored that help us understand what we are seeing. We can also do this fictively...
- [12:18] Simulat Almendros: Maybe it works this way - external objects affect our brains in a certain sort of way so we can think about them - but words also affect our brains in a similar way - but words don't necessarily have to relate to something that exists
- [12:18] Sage Hartmann: why are those the only options, Vajra?
- [12:18] Chance Luckstone: what is the (1) something else?
- [12:18] Thoth Jantzen: ...without having to experience a thing - we can imagine - mix things together to get an idea of something that cannot exist.... unicorns, demons, etc.
- [12:18] Alaya Kumaki: I also can say that when there are lies around , we are being deceive to believe what doesn't exist at all
- [12:19] Marsilio Gagliano: existence is only one type of actuality; actuality is required for an object to be thought, but not existential actuality?
- [12:19] Oswy Gothly: Blue Dragons are conceivable and my avatar is the proof. I rest my case??
- [12:19] SlashNDMK Veeper: does this lead to religion?..
- [12:19] Thoth Jantzen: you're saying it is proof enough, Oswy... we get the idea when you say it.
- [12:19] Marya Blaisdale: Well Oswy, that is a graphic representation of a blue dragon, but it is not a blue dragon ;D
- [12:19] Renald Starostin: Suppose all thoughts are about ideas, some of which are formed from perceptions, current and stored. (Perhaps all ideas.)
- [12:19] Vajra Raymaker: Well, sage, name another. Chance, (1) something else: there are several ways to go here. We can consider them One is it is about the idea of Pegasus another is that it is about the property of being a flying horse etc.
- [12:19] harmoniasophia Scribe: but fundamentally the words were originally a thought that someone named so in a sense made it existent, where did the original idea of the word come from
- [12:19] Thoth Jantzen: even if dragons don't exist and blue is just a perceptual pattern we recognize.
- [12:21] Renald Starostin: Ideas would then stand as a bridge to external objects, in some cases.
- [12:21] Oswy Gothly: Marya, I could behave been Pegasus. Are you saying I am just a mind in dragons clothing??
- [12:21] Alaya Kumaki: the ideology of the existence of something, when one has never had experienced this object with its one senses, may have been induce but trust in others saying, as it is always occurring, .. We take one on their words; it started with kids and parents for instance
- [12:21] Vajra Raymaker: We need to distinguish between representations, and represented objects, Os.
- [12:21] Marsilio Gagliano: what can be thought is actual in some way, even if it does not exist
- [12:22] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, Ren, for role of ideas. Son in the case of a Ren idea it is my bridge to Ren. But in the case of a Pegasus idea, I have no bridge to Pegasus
- [12:22] Sage Hartmann: Well, 'what something is about' is a predicate that takes propositions as objects, no? But predicates only are meaningful on certain kinds of objects. Wouldn't this mean that some propositions are not about something or nothing, but that it simply isn't meaningful to ask what they are about?
- [12:22] Renald Starostin: Vaj, why do you need a bridge to Pegasus?
- [12:22] Vajra Raymaker: Alaya, I agree that trust is a big part of what makes communication possible. Essential perhaps.
- [12:22] Thoth Jantzen: I agree there, but we have to I think keep in mind how we are classifying those things. Mentally, it is all representation. Represented 'real objects' are just a subset....
- [12:23] Marya Blaisdale: I expect the bridge is a way of showing 'how' you get to Pegasus from reality, Ren

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[12:23] Oswy Gothly: Vajram Marsilio. I could have been a diagram in a book on Dragons. People could look at it and feel well yes its conceivable but not actual so in that sense its real. i could exist in a possible world?? I am not like a round hole that is truly inconceivable???

[12:23] Vajra Raymaker: Sage, possibly so. But if a proposition (or thought) is about nothing, then how can have any content.

[12:23] Renald Starostin: Marya, but there is no Pegasus to get to

[12:23] Sage Hartmann: I didn't say it was about nothing, I said the question of whether it was about anything wasn't semantically meaningful

[12:23] Thoth Jantzen: but a unicorn and a cow are both representations in our mind in much the same ways as each other, with the difference being we know one is 'real' and one is fictive.

[12:23] Oswy Gothly: Marya, I am not a dragon in human clothing??

[12:23] Marsilio Gagliano: possibility is real, so I agree Oswy

[12:23] Vajra Raymaker: Oh, Ren, only if Pegasus existed. I don't need a bridge to Pegasus because I can't really talk about him (in my view)

[12:24] Marsilio Gagliano: Pegasus is possible

[12:24] Marya Blaisdale: there is the 'idea or concept' of such a thing Renald - I think that's what it's aiming at - not that it is a thing that exists

[12:24] Thoth Jantzen: but as representational mental objects we can manipulate and thinking about them the same way.

[12:24] Fox Monacular: to me Pegasus is as real as a blue whale... I have never seen either, but I can describe both to you very well

[12:24] Renald Starostin: Vaj, we've been talking about him. ;-)

[12:24] Renald Starostin: Fox, exactly.

[12:25] Vajra Raymaker: Both representations are real, Thoth, your cow and unicorn. But only one has an extension in the external world, world external to the mind. Distinguish representations and represented objects

[12:25] Renald Starostin: Although, there may be people you trust who HAVE seen blue whales.

[12:25] Thoth Jantzen: yes...

[12:25] Marsilio Gagliano: If we begin but defining intentionality as a relation to an actuality through a representation, we create a problem.

[12:25] Fox Monacular: :)

[12:26] Vajra Raymaker: It certainly SEEMS like that, Ren : -) But maybe we do not always have good knowledge of our own thoughts/minds. We think we are thinking about one thing, when really it is about another thing

[12:26] Marsilio Gagliano: Let's toss out talk about representations

[12:26] Thoth Jantzen: but my point is Vaj, that mentally they are equivalent types of things within different subcategories....that's all.

[12:26] Thoth Jantzen: mentally they are not 'different'.

[12:26] Sage Hartmann: I mean, aren't we taking a concept of 'aboutness' that applies very nicely to certain situations where we are familiar with the concept, and trying to extend it too far beyond its context, in these examples, so that we could fill in the answer either way depending on how we extended the concept into new domains, as we could with any question that wasn't well-defined in the new context?

[12:26] Vajra Raymaker: Interesting, Mars. How so?

[12:26] Alaya Kumaki: language communication and conception are all linked through trust, and that trust bridge is what make the transition between the object conceptualisation and its reality if you get to think about it throughout communication , and this is also the achil heal of communication, that can lead to much inexistant conception

[12:26] Renald Starostin: Vaj, that's always possible, in fact likely. But allowing ideas to be things in their own right seems a possible solution.

[12:26] Simulat Almendros: nods to sage

[12:26] harmoniasophia Scribe: I agree Marsilio

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- [12:27] Vajra Raymaker: Mars, "representation" ambiguous, as between descriptive content and actual medium/vehicle/sentence/brain event
- [12:27] Alaya Kumaki: convo is too fast
- [12:27] Vajra Raymaker: okay, Thoth
- [12:27] Marsilio Gagliano: well, when I think of an intelligible relation...say 'being greater than', I think of the relation itself, not some representation of it
- [12:27] Vajra Raymaker: could be, Sage
- [12:28] Alaya Kumaki: *le tendon d'achille*, mmm how do I translate that
- [12:28] Chance Luckstone: I'm stuck on the relationship between idea and object and how that would be essential....
- [12:28] Marya Blaisdale: Achilles Heel, Alaya :)
- [12:29] Renald Starostin: Ah... d'Achille ;-)
- [12:29] Vajra Raymaker: Ideas certainly exist, Ren. There is no problem about calling them "things" imo. But when we seem to be thinking about Pegasus, are we really thinking of an idea. Then why not say the same when we are thinking of Bossy the cow, as Thoth suggests. Uniform treatment. But then, how do we ever succeed in thinking about the world, or sharing info about the actual world
- [12:29] Chance Luckstone: I just don't see that
- [12:29] Marsilio Gagliano: if ideas are like things that represent other things, we get into a loop from which we will never escape
- [12:30] Renald Starostin: Vaj, if ideas can be built out of perceptions, current and stored?
- [12:30] Marsilio Gagliano: representational realism just doesn't work; Berkeley showed that
- [12:30] Thoth Jantzen: connection with perceptions, I think, Vaj, could be one way. we encounter cows in reality...we don't often encounter unicorns.
- [12:30] harmoniasophia Scribe: what is actual Vaj, I do not think what we experience through the senses is what is actual, imo
- [12:30] Fox Monacular: is there anything that we can think of that is not a representation in one way or another?
- [12:30] Vajra Raymaker: Chance, okay. I was not really maintaining that that was required, but I think that that was suggested as an alternative role for ideas in all this
- [12:30] Bleu Oleander: isn't it about transparency of phenomenal representation that if the system using it cannot recognize it as a representation
- [12:30] Simulat Almendros: Vajra - is that really a philosophical question though - isn't it a question to be answered by cognitive science and neurobiology and not by logic and conceptual analysis?
- [12:31] Vajra Raymaker: ah, Mars.
- [12:31] Alaya Kumaki: ah yeah Achilles heel, is the bridge , which trust is, that may bring confusion about what is or not
- [12:31] Oswy Gothly: Vajra, doesn't it have something to do with the relationship between conceivability and possibility. Many things are conceivable and so take their place in the realm of ideas. Not all things that we label as conceivable are possible. Like round squares. They are just metaphysically out?
- [12:31] Renald Starostin: Sim, the mechanics, yes.
- [12:31] Thoth Jantzen: for example, in certain ways, is a black hole any more 'real' for us than unicorns? Logically and scientifically we can think about them and demonstrate that exist....
- [12:31] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, Thoth, and that connects to I think issue number 4 on our list (in note card)
- [12:31] Simulat Almendros: Renald - is there more to it than the mechanics
- [12:31] Paula Palou: if you feel nothing from the neck down is everything a construct?
- [12:31] Renald Starostin: Ah, Sim, let's not start that. ;-)
- [12:31] Thoth Jantzen: objectively... even if we do not encounter a black hole, we have real (perceptual) evidence they do and logical underpinning to support that interpretation.
- [12:32] Vajra Raymaker: Perhaps not, Har. Maybe only forms or patterns or such things exist
- [12:32] Simulat Almendros: Renald - awwwww :-)

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- [12:32] Alaya Kumaki: why do we created metaphorical meaning, and that people take them literally? Is it cause they like to believe in what doesn't exist, or is it because the ability of abstraction isn't doing the job
- [12:32] harmoniasophia Scribe: even if I feel everything from the neck down it is still a construct as perception is projection
- [12:32] Vajra Raymaker: Sure, Os, absolutely I would agree about conceivability/possibility
- [12:32] Marya Blaisdale: Well, the other things that come after mechanics - are essentially interpretations methinks
- [12:32] Marsilio Gagliano: patterns 'exist' as possibilities for determinate, historical actualities
- [12:33] Renald Starostin: Lets not confuse perception with conception, either.
- [12:33] Marsilio Gagliano: possibility and actuality are two, co-equal modes of being
- [12:33] Alaya Kumaki: yes they can cohabitate very well
- [12:34] SlashNDMK Veeper: socially construct ...build by the collectiveness of perception in the society which we are in.. We don't need the trust on that. Also the solid form of it. Am I wrong?
- [12:34] Vajra Raymaker: good question Alay. Metaphorical meaning is a biggie to explain
- [12:34] Renald Starostin: Marya, things can precede mechanics, too.
- [12:34] Oswy Gothly: Marsilio Except that Flying Horses are physically impossible that is a slight fly in the ointment?
- [12:34] Marsilio Gagliano: so intentionality involves relation to possible objects as well as historically determinate actualities like rocks
- [12:34] Sage Hartmann: what about necessity, Marsilio? Do you not consider that on the same plane?
- [12:34] Simulat Almendros: But it seems to me to be a thing that we should think of Renald - when concepts get so convoluted that they get impossible to understand or even stated, then maybe we are looking in the wrong place for the answers
- [12:34] Marya Blaisdale: What sort of things, Renald?
- [12:34] harmoniasophia Scribe: I do not even think forms exist as my mind creates the pattern and I see what I project, name it and call it "real" like a projector projecting onto a screen, or seeing my face in the mirror, these are not "actual" things I see in reality, they are projections
- [12:34] Marsilio Gagliano: necessity is what is the case for every possible
- [12:35] Renald Starostin: Marya, if interpretation follows, speculation precedes.
- [12:35] Vajra Raymaker: Who are you asking Mars, about what intentionality involves 12:34?
- [12:35] Sage Hartmann: I like Mars' characterization
- [12:35] Marsilio Gagliano: I think intentionality is more than a relation to the actual
- [12:36] Vajra Raymaker: What more do you think it involves, Mars?
- [12:36] harmoniasophia Scribe: potentiality is actual, kinetic is but a mere manipulation of part of the potential
- [12:36] Renald Starostin: Darwin, for instance, had nothing to work with as far as the immediate mechanics of evolution.
- [12:36] Marsilio Gagliano: it intimately involves the possible
- [12:36] Oswy Gothly: Mars I think I agree with that
- [12:36] Vajra Raymaker: Well, I think I can agree with that too
- [12:37] Vajra Raymaker: All, I would disagree with is the claim that it is possible to think about something that does not exist
- [12:37] Sage Hartmann: Vajra, the problem might be what you mean by 'exist'...?
- [12:37] Renald Starostin: Vaj, I disagree, too, but I'm not sure for the same reason :-)
- [12:37] Marsilio Gagliano: to be is a better choice than to exist
- [12:37] Vajra Raymaker: In any case where people would appear to be thinking about something that does not exist, I would suggest that they either do not know what they are thinking about, or that they are not thinking anything at all
- [12:37] Chance Luckstone: would you call that a limitation of the human mind, Vaj?

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- [12:38] Fox Monacular: maybe it's like in dreaming - the brain takes elements of things, experiences and such, and then mixes it in some more or less meaningful way
- [12:38] Oswy Gothly: What is not exist? Related to Pegasus.
- [12:38] Fox Monacular: so the same in waking life
- [12:38] Thoth Jantzen: Vajra, your previous statement? I often think about things that don't exist...was that a typo or did I miss something?
- [12:38] Simulat Almendros: I agree Renald - so I suggest that asking how thinking can succeed in being about things might be answered by thinking in terms about how the brain actually generates thoughts (mechanics) rather than answered by logical analysis - even though I don't know how that mechanics works
- [12:38] Vajra Raymaker: we need to trace that out, Ren
- [12:38] Marsilio Gagliano: Pegasus has being, even if Pegasus does not exist
- [12:38] Sage Hartmann: Well that would be one way to consistently define 'aboutness' Vajra, in my opinion, but it seems like it's a semantic point there
- [12:38] Renald Starostin: Sim, you just restated what I meant.
- [12:39] Thoth Jantzen: the idea exists, even the it is not existing external to our minds.
- [12:39] Simulat Almendros: cool Renald :-)
- [12:39] Fox Monacular: I think Pegasus exists just as well as historical figures of the past exist
- [12:39] Vajra Raymaker: Marsilio!!! Pegasus has being without existing, ala Meinong?
- [12:39] Oswy Gothly: Vajra, are you saying that they are ignorant of some vital piece of information ? That in some sense they are mislead? This if they knew physics they would know Pegasus is impossible he couldn't fly at all?
- [12:40] Vajra Raymaker: I would argue that there is no such thing as a special kind of existence different from ordinary existence which Pegasus or Santa Claus have. They just don't exist
- [12:40] Marsilio Gagliano: Pegasus may not be compossible with current physical laws; that does not mean that Pegasus is impossible absolutely speaking
- [12:40] Renald Starostin: It's possible to think about Pegasus and know one is not thinking about an actual winged horse. Pegasus is a shared idea. A concept without a directly corresponding percept.
- [12:40] Thoth Jantzen: I think she is saying that the idea of things is what exists, separate of the actual things themselves, in our minds as patterns. And it is true, and these patterns also do influence our behaviour and even external reality, in many ways.
- [12:41] Vajra Raymaker: Oswy, I am indeed saying there is ignorance about their own thoughts, our own thoughts.
- [12:41] Marsilio Gagliano: Vajra, that is precisely why you find intentionality so puzzling
- [12:41] Oswy Gothly: Vajra If Santa existed as a physical thing he would destroy the earths environment in a micro second.
- [12:41] Simulat Almendros: Vajra - Pegasus doesn't exist but the idea of Pegasus exists?
- [12:41] Alaya Kumaki: they may have been mislead and the trust is now unbalance to create good differentiation between abstraction and literal objects.. And this for a long time, we often time forget the time period of deceivfulness of human relation and the consequences it can do in one's mind
- [12:41] Thoth Jantzen: how much money has Hollywood made in the movie business and how has that affected our society?
- [12:41] Vajra Raymaker: I never said that Pegasus is impossible by the way, at least not logically impossible.
- [12:42] Simulat Almendros: also - lets note that the idea of Pegasus is a string of words
- [12:42] Marsilio Gagliano: and possibility is one way in which things are (being)
- [12:42] Sage Hartmann: Perhaps I am missing the direction of our question :) What is our goal in trying to determine whether something is about something or not? What is it we are trying to accomplish by extending the concept to include questions of existence?
- [12:42] harmoniasophia Scribe: does love exist?
- [12:42] Renald Starostin: Vajra, no, not logically impossible. Insufficiently broadly perceived, that's all.

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- [12:42] Vajra Raymaker: We could say that, Sim. But then perhaps we enter the regress that Mars was worried about.
- [12:42] Vajra Raymaker: okay Sim, yes could be a string of words. How would you develop that idea?
- [12:42] Fox Monacular: does a society exist?
- [12:43] SlashNDMK Veeper: all symbolic.
- [12:43] Oswy Gothly: Sage because it seem odd that ideas can be had about things that don't exist. How can they be about something that has no reality? Whatever reality is in this case?
- [12:43] Paula Palou: this is all a bit "*Ceci n'est pas une pipe*" don't you think?
- [12:43] Simulat Almendros: well - when I think about Pegasus I'm thinking about the string of words
- [12:43] Alaya Kumaki: human mind can be modulate and be lead to act very differently in front of objects versus reality, with long-time deceivefulness
- [12:43] Vajra Raymaker: Thanks Oswy, exactly
- [12:43] Marsilio Gagliano: clearly ideas are about things that don't exist, no?
- [12:43] Renald Starostin: What string of words?
- [12:43] Simulat Almendros: the string of words that describes Pegasus
- [12:43] Renald Starostin: Oh...
- [12:44] Sage Hartmann: But it seems to me that all concepts are about possibilities - and those that are reinforced strongly enough we acknowledge as actual, but what is wrong with the targets of words remaining in the possible, and the actual being a coherence effect?
- [12:44] Marsilio Gagliano: we have ideas about the past and the future; do they exist?
- [12:44] Simulat Almendros: the ideas exist :-)
- [12:44] harmoniasophia Scribe: lol Mars
- [12:44] Renald Starostin: I actually think about a horse with wings. I'm aware such have not been broadly perceived, and would upset rather well-established matters of anatomy, etc.
- [12:45] Alaya Kumaki: when we speak about object, they are representing ones relation to it also, and this relation is representing ones inner model or pattern, that is much more influencing , than the object itself
- [12:45] Oswy Gothly: Mars If we get into time we will be here all night !!!
- [12:45] Vajra Raymaker: Perhaps we should consider another one of our issues, as the others intersect with this one and can perhaps finesse it
- [12:45] Paula Palou: this is not a pipe...its a painting of a pipe
- [12:45] Marsilio Gagliano: the past does not exist. Otherwise it would be present. I have true ideas about the past. Therefore, there are ideas about non-existent.
- [12:45] Alaya Kumaki: so I conclude that its more relational than conceptual only
- [12:45] Renald Starostin: Well done, Mars
- [12:46] Vajra Raymaker: In particular, we might ask in the case of thoughts that are about things that clearly exist as such, e.g. my thought that Thoth has nice ears, what makes my thought be about THOTH and not some other object, such as one of those trees over there
- [12:46] harmoniasophia Scribe: are they true Mars, or does the power of your mind make them seem true?
- [12:46] Sage Hartmann: Mars, would you put the past in the domain of the possible, from our present perspective? Or is it actual? :)
- [12:46] Vajra Raymaker: you have ideas about real objects in the past Marsilio
- [12:46] Renald Starostin: Vaj, perception.
- [12:46] Vajra Raymaker: and real objects that may occur in future events
- [12:46] Simulat Almendros: the fact that you attribute the ears to Thoth, Vajra?
- [12:46] Oswy Gothly: Sage, not all concepts are possible logically possible ie Round Squares Some concepts might seem possible but might be based on lack of information ie ignorance. ie Pegasus. Does that then mean that the only things we can be intentional about are real things that are actually possible?
- [12:46] Vajra Raymaker: okay, perception is a good place to start
- [12:46] Renald Starostin: Harm, Mars, does it even matter that the ideas about the past are true? They're about the past...

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- [12:47] harmoniasophia Scribe: only now is actual but we do not experience now as we experience what we believe is now has already past
- [12:47] Marsilio Gagliano: the past is determinate in a way in which the future is not,
- [12:47] Sage Hartmann: Oswy, I don't think 'round squares' are a concept, Oswy -- it's an attempt to combine two concepts that doesn't yield a new one (or at least not to me)
- [12:48] harmoniasophia Scribe: it matters Renald, if you base your decision on them, is like basing on dust in the wind
- [12:48] Oswy Gothly: Paula I think the Surrealists had a lot of good points to make on this issue.
- [12:48] Vajra Raymaker: yes Sage, but now the question is, why Don't they yield a new concept. And the answer is, because there could never be such a thing in reality, presumably
- [12:48] Renald Starostin: Harmonia, yes, THAT matters. But it seems irrelevant to Marsilio's point.
- [12:49] harmoniasophia Scribe: the idea that the past gives us the ability to make sound judgments is cause for all chaos we experience in the world around us
- [12:49] Sage Hartmann: Vajra, no I think that's the effect, not the reason ;)
- [12:49] Renald Starostin: Vaj, some things aren't even possible as possibilities, depending on their definitions. Round squares are one such.
- [12:49] Simulat Almendros: its also responsible for the order we see too Harmonia :-)
- [12:49] Vajra Raymaker: yes, Ren
- [12:50] Vajra Raymaker: and what that means is that there could never be manifestations of those things
- [12:50] Oswy Gothly: Sage I agree they are an attempted concept that cannot logically work. So you can't have intentionality about this entity ie a round square.
- [12:50] harmoniasophia Scribe: when I see the now and judge by experience I influence the now and do not see what is there
- [12:50] Marsilio Gagliano: I don't know how much wisdom knowledge of the past can give, but without knowledge of the past, I could not complete a sentence that was meaningful; or listen to a song
- [12:50] Oswy Gothly: Mars I don't want to go down the time hole but there is a point of view that says the past and future are real. But let's not go there?
- [12:50] harmoniasophia Scribe: how do you know what you say is meaningful, what is meaning anyways, as value is not an intrinsic thing
- [12:51] Marsilio Gagliano: my point is that they are real; but their reality isn't captured by the notion of 'exist'
- [12:51] Sage Hartmann: But what I was saying earlier, isn't aren't all concepts about possibilities? And how well we can map them onto other perspectives of possibilities defines what we raise to the status of 'actual'?
- [12:51] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, I should say that I am a realist about the past and future, and often assume such realism in thinking about meaning and reference and aboutness
- [12:51] harmoniasophia Scribe: what is meaningful is closely related to the intentionality
- [12:51] Paula Palou: perhaps in the end we're just discussing language
- [12:51] Vajra Raymaker: yes, Har
- [12:51] Renald Starostin: uh-oh
- [12:51] Marsilio Gagliano: my idea of a chair includes all sorts of possibilities
- [12:51] SlashNDMK Veeper: as stated symbolic.. we keep changing from one object to another while we are discussing about abstract/illustration. Am I wrong?
- [12:52] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, Paula. I think that language tracks a lot of the phenomena here that we find in thought.
- [12:52] Oswy Gothly: Mars in 4D Space Time they are as real as I am a Blue Dragon!
- [12:52] Vajra Raymaker: For example, the two features distinctive of intentionality that I described in the beginning have linguistic tests
- [12:52] Alaya Kumaki: intention were very well directed, but the instruction manual was lost, to do it so it became as one wish, build it yourself
- [12:52] Renald Starostin: Mars, how are you distinguishing reality from existence?

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- [12:52] harmoniasophia Scribe: what is possible is real, what is manifested is a mere representation of the value placed on the possibility that has the most meaning to your intention
- [12:52] Vajra Raymaker: Is that a worry, Slash?
- [12:52] Marsilio Gagliano: tests?
- [12:52] Lew Zaytsev: Aren't we tracking in thought what can be conceived only in language?
- [12:53] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, there are two tests
- [12:53] Marsilio Gagliano: which are?
- [12:53] SlashNDMK Veeper: never mind.. I'm still listening
- [12:53] Sage Hartmann: Vajra, does that mean you think there is a uniquely correct answer to every question about occurrences in the past?
- [12:53] Simulat Almendros: Oswy - I thought you said you didn't want to talk about time !!! :-)
- [12:53] Vajra Raymaker: Their official labels, (1)existential generalization (2) substitution of identicals.
- [12:54] Marsilio Gagliano: by existential generalization you refer to the quantifier in predicate logic?
- [12:54] Vajra Raymaker: so, Joe believes that Pegasus will arrive soon. Can you say There is something of which Joe believes it will arrive soon
- [12:54] Oswy Gothly: Slash You are right we keep switching objects but the discussion is still focussed on what can you be intentional about. Where is it sensible appropriate to say I can think about this or that entity?
- [12:54] Vajra Raymaker: and for second test
- [12:54] Alaya Kumaki: like the one only type of envisaging it may seems so
- [12:54] SlashNDMK Veeper: thanks Oswy.
- [12:55] Oswy Gothly: Sim, time to be quiet about time?
- [12:55] Vajra Raymaker: Joe believes that Jocasta would make a fine wife. Jocasta = Joe's mother. Joe believes that mom would make a fine wife. Start with a true sentence, end with a false sentence after substituting identicals. Therefore, an intentional context.
- [12:56] Sage Hartmann: wait have we moved from intentionality to intentionality?
- [12:56] Vajra Raymaker: yes, Mars, I meant the quantifier
- [12:56] Alaya Kumaki: Joe believes that because someone lied to him ^^
- [12:56] Vajra Raymaker: good one, Sage. Yes, we did, because someone pointed out that language provides tests for the mental phenomenon.
- [12:57] Renald Starostin: All right... Joe has an idea of Pegasus. Joe believes his idea corresponds to an external object, or he wouldn't believe his idea corresponded to something capable of arriving soon. The fact that Joe may be wrong... what difference does that make?
- [12:57] Oswy Gothly: Or Joe is just ignorant of the real facts of the case?
- [12:57] Alaya Kumaki: here is the substitution
- [12:57] Marsilio Gagliano: the cases are different
- [12:57] harmoniasophia Scribe: what are real facts?
- [12:58] Marsilio Gagliano: in one case, Pegasus is not the sort of thing that can arrive
- [12:58] Renald Starostin nods
- [12:58] Alaya Kumaki: its very rare that you find a person believing in abstract non existing thing when they are raise in places with person who don't uses lie, and discriminate things , with delicatesse
- [12:58] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, having beliefs seemingly about nonexistent objects is one way we can have mistaken beliefs.
- [12:58] Marsilio Gagliano: in the other, an existent object is understood under two distinct formalities
- [12:58] Sage Hartmann: coherence tests, no? Ones that involve the contemplation of possibilities, yes? :) Is this not still consistent with the notion that we are escalating our notion of the possible to the actual when it passes a certain coherence threshold of reinforcement? It seems to me that is how perception works, at least.
- [12:59] Oswy Gothly: Harmonia The real fact is that she is his mother but he doesn't know for some reason.
- [12:59] Renald Starostin: Right... if Joe is in the circumstance of Oedipus, his ideas of Jocaste and of his mother are not the same.
- [12:59] harmoniasophia Scribe: all beliefs are mistaking representations, in my opinion

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- [12:59] Alaya Kumaki: someone hide the things in this history, and it was for politic power
- [13:00] Renald Starostin: Not only not the same, but do not, in his understanding, correspond to the same object. He too may be wrong, as in the case of Oedipus
- [13:00] Oswy Gothly: Mars could you explain your last point a little more?
- [13:00] Marsilio Gagliano: about Pegasus or Jocasta?
- [13:00] Oswy Gothly: The issue of formalities being different?
- [13:00] Vajra Raymaker: two distinct formalities, I think
- [13:01] Alaya Kumaki: being in a state of investing oneself into some.. Trustees I would say
- [13:01] Marsilio Gagliano: anything can be seen under several formalities. I see a dog as a mammal, as a pet, as a danger, etc.
- [13:01] Vajra Raymaker: Sorry Ren, I didn't quite understand the earlier question
- [13:02] Renald Starostin: :-) Which one, Vaj? I've lost track, too
- [13:02] Sage Hartmann: Mars Re: [12:58] - but if someone made a Pegasus and brought them to someone, might they recognize it to be what they were thinking of and say aha, it has arrived!
- [13:02] Alaya Kumaki: that is always a self investments there is a will behind that also
- [13:02] Marsilio Gagliano: so some mistakes occur when we get confused about the objects to which those formalities allow us to refer
- [13:02] Vajra Raymaker: interesting, Sage/Mars
- [13:02] harmoniasophia Scribe: intentionality sets one up for disappointment for what is intended is expected, when disappointment comes one never discerns the reason was that the belief which set up the intention was based on a false understanding of what is actual so when one gets what one wanted is not what they actually because of the non existence of forms
- [13:03] Marsilio Gagliano: if Pegasus is a flying horse, then - ignoring the issue of the proper name - if someone brought me a horse that could fly, I'd say that it is a Pegasus
- [13:03] Alaya Kumaki: when one is dealing with abstract concept , no they will never recognise the one things if it arrive, since every thing was based on fiction before
- [13:03] Vajra Raymaker: Yes, so this suggests that we should not think that the person seeks an idea of Pegasus, but Pegasus itself. Just as when one loves, perhaps, one loves not the idea, but the thing itself
- [13:03] Oswy Gothly: Mars but in Joes case it is just a case of ignorance on his part. We as observers can see the tragedy ie the two possible formalities Joe cant? Isn't it just the case that we are often in Joe's situation?
- [13:03] Vajra Raymaker: referring to sage 13:02 in my remark at 13:03
- [13:04] Alaya Kumaki: then Vajra, they have learn to know this person,, and not fantasize about it before, the time to meet is done
- [13:04] Sage Hartmann: Well they are seeking the possibility of an experience that fulfils their concept -- and any such object which they could identify/recognize as filling that role for them, would be what they were referring to imo.
- [13:05] Renald Starostin: Why must they be seeking? One can encounter something and recognize it without having sought it.
- [13:05] Alaya Kumaki: re - cognition means a repetition, Ren
- [13:05] harmoniasophia Scribe: not really Ren but is another discussion
- [13:05] Renald Starostin: Having the idea does mean a certain preparation to encounter and recognize, of course.
- [13:06] Marsilio Gagliano: and preparation is a cognizing of possibilities
- [13:06] Renald Starostin: Yes
- [13:06] Sage Hartmann: I think the problem is we are largely getting tangled up about the concept of existence. I see existence as referring mostly to possibility, and the actual as being things that are epistemologically distinguished as known
- [13:06] Renald Starostin: Also yes, :-)
- [13:06] Alaya Kumaki: preparation of loss of the fantasy for the reality